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A proposal to divide between the parties the loss suffered by plaintiffs in negligence cases has no novelty among law teachers. In the last
few decades it has been advocated by highly competent authorities on
tort law. It is believed that very few lawyers would deny that the
defense of contributory negligence often operates with great injustice,
nor disagree with the view that the principle of last opportunity, which
to a slight extent curbs the operation of the other rule, is unsatisfactory
in merely shifting the entire loss from plaintiff to defendant. The shift
is nevertheless demonstrably justifiable to the extent that at least it
places liability on the party whose fault is preponderant. Probably few
lawyers have given much thought to the fact that, given a "wrongful
act", the criminal law punishes the wrong but civil liability is based upon
the act-including its consequences. An act perfectly traced in consequences would be the best basis for judgment of the wrong, but our
inability exactly to trace actual consequences, and our forced reliance
upon artificial rules of "legal causation", sometimes result in an unjustifiable disregard of the parties' comparative faults.
An apportionment of loss between them must, it would seem, be
acknowledged to be a just solution, and a reluctance to alter the common law should not obstruct improvement if the reluctance cannot be
rested on any logical or ethical basis. Objections urged against it have
been of a supposedly practical nature. The possibility of accurately appraising comparative negligences has been questioned, and therefore
the possibility of a just apportionment of loss. It has been urged, perhaps in particular, that a jury is unfit for the performance of the task.
Nevertheless, in one great field of law, this principle of comparative
negligence has been successfully applied by judges for centuries in
various countries, and is today applied in every great maritime country
in the world save only the United States. Moreover, the principle is
today established by statute to varying extent in some of the states of
this country in the field of negligence. It is notorious, too, that lawyers
in any state would be very much divided on the question of a jury's
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unfitness to apply the principle. And it is certain that juries actually
do apply it, however roughly, in their verdicts, and have done so always,
and notably ever since the bar of contributory negligence came into the
law in the early 1800s.'
A proposal to displace by a statutory rule the rules of common law
is certainly undesirable unless the latter are demonstrably unethical or
otherwise unsatisfactory, and the former not. The first part of the
present discussion will therefore be devoted to consideration of the
common-law system of civil liability for negligence, with attention centered upon the doctrines of contributory negligence and last opportunity 2 as dealt with under principles of "legal" causation. The primary
purposes of this discussion are to emphasize what is generally well
recognized-the impossibility of explaining either doctrine by those
principles; to remind readers of the artificial character of "legal" causation; to make clear the relation between our present system of act-andconsequence causation and the original rule of liability in our medieval
law; to demonstrate the extraordinary confusion in orthodox explanations of the last clear chance doctrine as embodied in the Restatement
of Torts between liability for the consequences of an act and liability
for moral fault-even were the former undistorted by restrictions of
legal causation; and' to urge the desirability of basing upon social
fault any statutory provision for apportionment of loss between plaintiff
and defendant.
Writing of the thirteenth century, Holdsworth tells us that "aman
is liable for the harm which he has inflicted upon another, whether
S.
.intentionally, carelessly or accidentally. In adjudicating upon
questions of civil liability the law makes no attempt to try the intent of
a man, and the conception of negligence has as yet hardly arisen. A man
acts at his peril." 4 And this was stated as still law by Bacon in 1596
and by Hale after 1660.' It is very evident, however, that even in the
1. The above factors will be treated in Part II of this article.
2. This name will be used in referring to the general doctrine developed before
publication of the Restatement of Torts and "last clear chance" will be employed in
referring to the narrower doctrine embodied in the Restatement as sustained by
dominant authority. In the designation "ultimate negligence," sometimes employed
by writers, the "ultimate" is open to the same qualifications as "last," and omission
of reference to "chance" or "opportunity" disregards the doctrine's most distinctive
feature.
3. To be discussed in Part II.
4. 3 HoLDswoRrH, HISTORY Or ENGLISH LAW 299 (1909); 8 Id. 446 (2d ed.
1937).
5. "In capital causes, in favorem vitae, the law will not punish in so high a degree, except the malice of the will and intention do appear; but in civil trespasses and
injuries that are of an inferior nature, the law doth rather consider the damage of
the party wronged, than the malice of him that was the wrongdoer". 7 BACON,
WORKS 307, 347 (Spedding) ; 1 HALE, PLzAS OF THE CROWN, 15, 16. Both are cited
by Holdsworth.
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medieval period there were present in the law forces that were destined
to destroy the old conception of liability.
In the first place the criminal law, even then,-since its object was
to punish a wrongdoer, whereas that of the civil law was to give monetary compensation to a sufferer-did mitigate punishment on the basis
of self-defense and misadventure, which can reasonably be regarded as
mental states. This example was bound to affect, ultimately, consideration of a defendant's civil liability. Its influence was manifest from the
fifteenth century onward in the appearance of new types of tort based
on wrongful volition or intent; but most significantly it operated from
the sixteenth century onward through the doctrine of negligence.' The
immediate result was an addition to the medieval system of a few new
torts in which acts were wrongful because negligent. The ultimate
result was the transmutation of that system into our modern law.
But that does not mean that the transmutation is even today complete. Long after negligent acts had come to constitute the greatest
portion of the field of torts, blameworthy conduct, "fault" or wrongdoing, was established as the basis of all liability, civil and criminal. But
it was only in a limited sense that this was true. Negligence is the
moral (or social) fault of so acting as to expose another person or his
interests to an unreasonable risk of harm. 7 Now, the wrongful conduct
of the actor, being merely and precisely an expression of his fault, this
latter is no less and no more than the wrongful act the cause of the ultimate harm. It is, indeed, the true cause of the harm. But fault and
act are no more identical than artistic genius is identical with a picture
in which it finds expression. In the thirteenth century violent and intentional wrongs were recognized in acts, but there was no glimmer of
a general conception of fault in legal minds. Once, therefore, wrongs
were recognized which we call negligent, the liability attached to them
was that imposed for the older wrongs of violence and intent: liability
for the act, therefore for its consequences (so far as men then imperfectly discerned them).'
6. 8

HoLmswoRtm, HISTORY

449-64.

7. Excluding conduct that is "recklessly disregardful" of others. RESTATEMENT,
It is there said that
TORTS § 282 (1934) (Hereinafter cited as "RESTATEMENT").
"In the RESTATEMENT . . . negligence is any conduct," etc. §463, comment b.
The phrase "negligent conduct" illustrates the general understanding that negligence
is a quality of conduct. § 283 reads: "Unless the actor is a child or an insane person, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being negligent
is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances." Many passages could be cited
in the official comments to the same effect. The phrase "wrongful conduct" is constantly used to indicate the act as distinguished from the fault, and the distinction
is important.
8. There is no negligence unless the actor foresees some harm. Holdsworth felt
that liability, like fault, should be limited (as in contract) to foreseeable harm, he
therefore disliked the modem English cases that establish a contrary view. In re
Polemis [1921] 3 K.B. 560; cf. Weld-Blundell v. Stephens [1920] A.C. 983-84 (per
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"In fact", says Holdsworth, "right down to the nineteenth century
there is a chain of authority in which the medieval rule is stated and
relied on .

.

It would, however, be misleading to think that the

lawyers, as late as the nineteenth century, were prepared to hold that
direct damage, caused by an unavoidable accident in the doing of a
lawful act, would expose to liability".'
There is a reason why men repeated the old words and assumed
the sufficiency of the old idea. It is a very simple one: that an act is
visible and its simpler consequences readily detectable. In looking for
consequences attention was therefore naturally directed to the wrongful
act, not to moral fault. Theories of causation were necessarily developed in seeking to define what harm was the consequence of a man's
act, and so by whose act harm was done.
It should here be noted that cases even of the medieval period refused relief to a plaintiff if the admitted act of the defendant was followed by "intervening events of such a kind that no foresight could
have been expected to look out for them."' 1 It might, then, happen that
the intervening action which defeated the plaintiff was his own."- Obviously, there was latent in these cases something which in result resembled the bar of contributory negligence. Whether there was any
similarity other than in result will be later discussed. The old cases
meant, says Holdsworth, that a defendant could escape liability if he
proved "that the act, which was the immediate cause of damage, was
2
done, not by himself, but by the plaintiff.'
It must have been clear from a very early time that identification
of the actual consequences of even a single act involved difficulty, and
that disentanglement of the consequences of concurrent causes was impossible. Some limitation, for practical purposes, upon the tracing of
Lord Sumner). The basis for his dislike of the rule they enforced was the opinion
quoted infra at note 17. Cf. also remarks of Vaughan-Williams, L.J., in The Racine,
[1906] P., at 277. Our rule with exceedingly few exceptions is the ancient rule for
all torts. For example, if an excavator causes to fall neighboring land which (the
jury finds) would have fallen if in its natural state, but which actually has buildings
on it, the excavator is liable for damage to the buildings because liable for the
natural consequences of his wrongful act-which was, causing land in its natural
state to fall, without reference to what could be foreseen. Similarly, if one negligently digs, knowing the likelihood of harm to the buildings, his liability therefor

is not limited to harm reasonably foreseeable.
9. 8 HoLswoRT, HisoRY 454, with a page of illustrative quotations, and
455.
303.

10. Hoi.is, CommoN
11. 3

LAw

HOLDSWORTH, HIsToRy

92 (1881); approved in 3

HoLDSWORTH,

HIsToRY

301-2.

12. 8 Id. 446. This rule has been referred to by writers as "the medieval rule"
or "Holdsworth's medieval rule." It must be distinguished from the general medieval
principle of liability stated supra at note 4. It is, however, an application of that
principle in a special case-not an exception to it. It will therefore be referred to as
the medieval rule of non-recovery.
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actual causation-some more or less artificial theory of causation within
the law-was therefore inescapable.
That rules of legal causation should have been developed with
reference to the wrongful conduct of the actor was so natural, indeed
inevitable, that one is inclined to assume that they could in no way be
objectionable. Nevertheless such rules have had regrettable results,
which are, for example, startlingly manifested in the treatment of the
problems of last clear chance as embodied in the Restatement. The
reason is that our rules of legal causation, being developed in relation to
the act without constant recurrence for correction to the fault, are in
some cases far removed from both actual causation and ethical solutions. Mr. Bohlen described them as follows:
"Legal proximity of causation may be defined as that conception of cause and effect which has been adopted by the courts as
the test by which to ascertain whether a particular harm is to be
ascribed to a particular act or omission as its consequences as a
prerequisite to the imposition of legal responsibility therefor. This
conception has from time to time varied . . . The proximity
between the act done and the harm sustained is, however, only one
step to the determination of the final question of legal liability.
This depends also on many other principles of limitation of legal
liability which are entirely distinct'from, and in no way dependent
upon, legal causal connection. Some of these have their origin in
the historical development of the law; others are based on principle
of policy; others upon an instinctive conservatism . . . and
others are founded on deep-rooted fundamental principles of justice
1
as conceived and developed in the common law of England."'1
No matter how excellent it may be, it is necessarily an artificial system,14 but the point here in question is that its long development has
necessarily left it subject to one great defect. To have chosen the concrete act instead of the intangible fault as the starting point of causation
was quite right; essentially they were indistinguishable as the cause.
But since the causation chain was made artificial in the manner indicated, and its course not corrected by constant reference to the original
fault and cause, the fault and the harm are often not logically connected
by the rules of legal causation. This will be found true, for example, of
both contributory negligence and last clear chance. But this was rarely
13. Bohlen, Contributory Negligence, 21 HARV. L. REv. 233, 234, 236 (1908).
This essay is reprinted in BOHLEN, STUDIES

IN THE

LAW

OF

TORTS 500, 502, 504

(1926). It was easy to ignore or forget the difference between actual and legal causation before the Restatement was written, and judicial opinions did so. Even Mr.
Bohlen, in an essay of 1901, wrote of "the legally proximate (that is the natural)
consequences" of an act-40 Am. L. REG. (N.S.) 79, 83.
14. The gain in ability to identify actual consequences which has come with increasing knowledge (infra note 36) has been more or less offset in rules of legal
causation by the causes which Mr. Bohlen mentions.
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judicially admitted. Instead, it was masked in the latter case by misrepresenting-when so-called "antecedent negligence" is excluded-the
nature of defendant's moral fault.'
Holdsworth explained the long life of the medieval principle of
civil liability by the fact that "it had been made the basis of a technical
system of fixed rules"." The rules he had in mind were not those of
legal causation, but it is believed that no others were in the long run
so effective to that end. He also adhered through many years to the
opinion that "the doctrine [of civil liability] in the form in which it
exists in our modem common law is anomalous. It is anomalous, because it represents an attempt to piece together two incompatible
theories of civil liability-the medieval theory that liability is based on
an act which causes damage, and the modem theory that liability is, as
a general rule, based upon some moral fault either of the negligent or
of the intentional variety."" This has much foundation, and some will
later appear. It is also true, as he likewise said, that in our legal history
there are many illustrations of a growing insistence that civil liability
"should be based on some moral shortcoming .

.

.

.

[The] medieval

view as to liability was too narrow; and both the ethical ideas and the
social needs of modem times made it necessary that it should be modified.' 8 This also will come into view in a later part of this discussion.
Until a little more than a century ago there was only slow elaboration of the principles of negligence, without basic alteration in the system. Very great changes took place in the first half of the 1800s
through the introduction of the principles of contributory negligence
and the countervailing doctrine of last opportunity. Various early cases
of the first half of the last century presented two remarkable features.
One was, that although there clearly appeared to be negligence by both
plaintiff and defendant, and although the application of the bar of contributory negligence (had it already been clearly established as a principle of law) was therefore possible, it was also possible to say that one
or the other party might nevertheless have averted the accident, either,
therefore, justifying the bar if plaintiff also had that "last" opportunity,
or nullifying it if the opportunity was the defendant's. The second salient
characteristic of this group of early cases is that-notwithstanding the
medley of judicial utterances that characterizes them as respects the doctrines applicable and as respects legal causation-both judges and juries
13. See text at note 13 supra.
16. 8 HOLI)SWORTH, HISTORY 447.

17. Id. at 462.

18. Id. at 455. He is there discussing (452-58) the long persistence of the
medieval rule in bailments and trespass. Cases in which it still survives are discussed
at 465-82.
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(sometimes in defiance of the court's instructions) strove to put liability on the more blameworthy party. The confusion caused by the
vague terminology of causation is conspicuous. Notwithstanding the
desirability of avoiding in this summary discussion a clutter of detail
regarding individual cases, it will therefore be profitable to look carefully at the opinions in some of these early cases from which the doctrines of contributory negligence and last opportunity are customarily
derived. Reasons can be given for denying that either doctrine was
involved in the earliest decisions now assigned to it. Some cases could
perfectly well have been assigned to one or the other doctrine. But,
what is far more important, their examination throws light, as just
said, on the identification of the primary wrongdoer as the all-important objective, and on the confusion inherent in any belief that that
party can be discovered by applying the terminology of causation.
A very few cases will therefore be examined seriatim.
Butterfield v. Forrester9 is generally regarded as having been the
first application of the bar of contributory negligence. Defendant put
a pole across the highway and plaintiff, "riding violently" in early evening when otherwise he might have seen the obstruction and escaped
injury, ran into it. There is only one judicial utterance in the opinions
that can be reasonably read as expressing the principle of contributory
negligence. Lord Ellenborough said: "One person being in fault will
not dispense with another using ordinary care for himself." But this
can not be read as expressing the bar of contributory negligence in its
usual sense because it does not fit the ordinary facts, the plaintiff being
manifestly regarded as the primary wrongdoer; and he was also the
last wrongdoer-though note that in applying, contributory negligence
order in time is not vital."0 On the other hand, Bayley, J. had charged
the jury, on circuit, "that if a person riding with reasonable and ordinary care could have seen and avoided the obstruction; and if . .
[plaintiff was not so riding] they should find .

.

. for the defend-

ant." These words can be read, in the light of later history, as embodying the language of last opportunity, but note that it was the plaintiff
who had that opportunity, which therefore only justified the bar of
contributory negligence (though a recent precedent had applied the
principle against a defendant).2 Note also that the case falls outside
19. 11 East 60 (K.B. 1809).
20. "Except as stated in §§ 479 and 480 [which deal with Last Clear Chance],
in determining whether the plaintiff's negligence has so contributed to his harm as to
bar recovery therefor it is immaterial that his negligence is antecedent or subsequent
to that of the defendant or that the two are actively and simultaneously operating"-See RESTATEmENT, ToRTs § 478 (1934).
21. Plaintiff was on wrong side of road, defendant turned into it and crossed to
the same side as properly his, and in turning struck plaintiff's horse. Lord Ellen-
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the Restatement, which only provides for negating the bar when a defendant has a last clear chance to save plaintiff from harm. Bayley, J.
also remarked in the argument before the court en banc: "the accident
appeared to happen entirely of his [plaintiff's] own fault." This language could b-e read in two ways without involving innovation in the
law. One is, as meaning that plaintiff's conduct amounted to assumption of risk, which was not then nor for a long time afterward distinguished from negligence 2 -- and for this view, also, there was recent
precedent in another judicial utterance (though it did not control the
other is, as a perfect statement of Holdsworth's
decision)." The
"medieval rule",2 4 that anyone-defendant or (as here) plaintiff-is
liable for the harm done by his acts.
Davies v. Mann, 5 habitually cited as the source of the principle of
last opportunity-a case extraordinarily vague in pleading, facts, and
verdict--exhibits much better than Butterfield v. Forresterthe principle
for which it is cited. The trial judge instructed the jury that if plaintiff had been negligent he could nevertheless recover (1) if defendant's
negligence was "the proximate cause" of plaintiff's injury, or (2) if the
injury could have been avoided by defendant's exercise of ordinary care
(meaning: after seeing plaintiff's jackass on the road). Both instructions are easily accepted as presenting in different words the principle
of last opportunity. The plaintiff had judgment, and a motion for a
new trial was refused. In the higher court it is notable that Baron
Parke relied on the charge in its second form. The truth of the matter,
so far as it can be stated in terms of causation, was stated with rare
judicial candor by Lord Campbell in his comment upon the case:
"There,"-said he- "although without the negligence of the
plaintiff the accident could not have happened, the negligence is not
supposed to have contributed within the rule upon this subject;
and, if the accident might have been avoided by the exercise of care
borough charged the jury that plaintiff's negligence could not relieve defendant; that
defendant "was bound to take that course which should carry him clear of the person
who was on his wrong side." Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44 (K.B. 1803).
22. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumptio, of Risk, 20 Hav. L. REv. 14, 17 (1906).
This essay is reprinted in his STUDIEs, supra note 13, at 445.
23. Defendant was driving on the wrong side of the road. Plaintiff's servant,
riding correctly on that side, instead of passing on the mid-road side, crossed over
defendant's line to pass him on the curb side, and his horse was killed. Lord Kenyon
instructed the jury: "It was putting himself voluntarily into the way of danger, and
the injury was of his own seeking." Cruden v. Fentham, 2 Esp. 685 (K.B. 1798).
See BOHLEN, supra at 17 n.2, STUDIEs at 446 n.9.
24. Supra at note 4.
25. 10 M. & W. 546 (Ex. 1842). Defendant's team collided with the plaintiff's
jackass. Whether the jackass was either negligently tethered or through plaintiff's
negligence on the highway did not appear. Baron Parke was of opinion that defendant did not even plead plaintiff's negligence, and the jury made no finding thereon.
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and skill on the part of the defendant, to his gross negligence it is
entirely ascribed, he and he only [supposedly] proximately causing
the loss".26

More notable was Baron Parke's suggestion that the bar of contributory negligence be limited to cases where failure to utilize a last
opportunity to save himself from harm was included in (or alone constituted) the negligence of the plaintiff. This formula, which covered
and justified the decisions in both the Butterfield' and Davies cases, is
clearly to be taken as evidencing hostility to the new principle of contributory negligence, in particular because in an earlier enunciation of
it Parke had justified,it as embodying the traditional principle of the
law. In such cases, he said, the plaintiff was "the author of his own
wrong"."
In the years between these two leading cases the bar of contributory
negligence was very clearly declared in a number of cases.2 8 As a whole
they leave with one the impression that juries were reluctant to bar
plaintiffs because of contributory negligence. Eight cases have been
cited above that seemingly involved it, yet plaintiff had judgment in all
with a single exception, and in that case he clearly had a last opportunity
26. Dowell v. General Steam Navigation Co., 5 E. & B. 195 (Q.B. 1855).
No doubt his comment was ironical; such would have been the attitude of anyone
familiar, as he was, with admiralty practice, in which loss had for centuries been
divided. In common law the novelty of barring plaintiff for contributory negligence
has been introduced, then within a generation counteracted by a doctrine that merely
shifted the loss without solving the problem, and was supported by specious but deceptive theory.
27. In Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry. Co., 3 M. & W. 244 (Exch. 1838) at 248,
he had said of Butterfield v. Forrester: "although there might have been negligence
on the part of the plaintiff, yet unless he might, by the exercise of ordinary care,
have avoided the consequences of the defendant's negligence, he is entitled to recover:
if by ordinary care he might have avoided them, he is the author of his own
wrong." In that case plaintiff fit this description and did not recover. In Dazdes
v. Mann, supra note 25, at 548, he said: "the negligence which is to preclude
a plaintiff from recovering . . . must be such as that he could by ordinary care
have avoided the consequence of the defendant's negligence." This would have permitted recovery, no matter how serious plaintiff's negligence, unless it was of the
particular type stated.
28. In Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 C. & P. 375 (C.P. 1832) the evidence left in
doubt the question whether defendant was driving on the incorrect side of the road.
The court charged that "if the plaintiff's negligence in any way concurred in producing the injury the defendant would be entitled to the verdict." In Williams v.
Holland, 6 C. & P. 23 (C.P. 1833) at 24, Bosanquet, J.charged: "if the injury was
occasioned partly by the negligence of the defendant, and partly by the negligence of
plaintiff's son, the verdict could not be for the plaintiff." In Luxford v. Large, 5
C. & P. 421 (K.B. 1833) plaintiff's wherry was possibly overloaded, defendant's
steamer's speed was improper. The charge, at 426, was that plaintiff could have a
verdict only if the swell that swamped the wherry was caused by defendant's improper speed "alone," so that plaintiff "was not at fault, and did not contribute to his
misfortune."
In Lord Campbell's opinion in Dowell v. General Steam Navigation Co., supra
note 26, at 206, which on various points is particularly clarifying, he contrasted the
rules in admiralty and at common law: "in a court of common law, the plaintiff has
no remedy if his negligence in any degree contributed to the accident"-italics as in
original.
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to avoid injury.2 9 In two others, despite contributory negligence, he
recovered because defendant had a last opportunity to avoid harming
himY0 In another, defendant's plea of his contributory negligence was
held bad in failing to show that that negligence lay "in not avoiding
the consequences of defendant's default".3" In three cases it seems
highly improbable that plaintiff was in no way contributorily negligent,
and the court charged explicitly that if he was, a verdict for him was imFinally, in one, the jury's repugpossible-yet in all he recovered."
nance to the rule very plainly appears. In that case Lord Kenyon
expressed the opinion that plaintiff voluntarily risked the harm he suffered-that it "was of his own seeking"; adding that if the jury thought
otherwise they should find for the plaintiff-which they did, and defendant moved a rule for a new trial. Lord Kenyon repeated his opinion but refused the rule, remarking "that after the finding of the jury,
as it was a question of public convenience [namely, use of the highway],
33
the verdict had better rest as it was".
This conflict of will between judge and jury appeared strikingly
in another case. Defendant's brig collided with plaintiff's sloop, and
Tindal, C.J., charged the jury that in order to give the latter a verdict
they must be satisfied that the injury "was not imputable in any degree
to any want of care . . . on the part of the plaintiff". He had a
verdict, and objections being immediately taken the Chief Justice asked
the jury how the verdict was reached. The answer was: "there were
faults on both sides". Defendant thereupon claimed a verdict, but the
Chief Justice answered: "No. There may be faults to a certain extent., 4
Without doubt the thought of the Chief Justice was that plaintiff's
fault might be merely trivial in its consequences, in which case justice
could not be served by barring recovery. Chief Justice Mansfield had
29. Butterfield v. Forrester, supra note 19.
30. Clay v. Wood, supra note 21; Davies v. Mann, supra note 25.
31. Bridge v. Grand Junction Ry. Co., supra note 27.
32. See note 28 supra.
33. Cruden v. Fentham, supra note 23.
34. Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 C. & P. 613 (C.P. 1839). Professor James remarks
that this "could fit in well enough with a scheme of liability based on negligence"meaning, the moral fault-"but, as Holdsworth points out, it is quite incompatible
with the 'medieval principle'"--Last Clear Chance: A Transitional Doctrine, 47
YAIE L.J. 704, 706 (1938). Mr. James refers to the fact that plaintiff recovered
despite admitted negligence. Holdsworth nowhere cites Raisin v. Mitchell. It is not
inconsistent with either the general medieval principle of liability (supra at note 4)
or with the special medieval principle making plaintiff liable when his own negligence
was in fact the primary cause of harm-szpra at note 12. It is inconsistent with the
latter, however, if that rested on plaintiff's act being, not the primary cause of the
harm he suffered, but the "direct" cause in the sense of being nearest in time, and
that was Holdworth's belief-it also seems to be Mr. James'. As already noted,
it is repudiated under § 478 of the RESTATEmENT, quoted supra note 21.
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earlier evidenced the same attitude in Flower v. Adams, 5 which was
decided in the same year as Butterfield v. Forrester. A disregard of
conduct deemed to be trivial was desirable under any rule of social behavior. It was also a necessity, inherent in our limited ability to trace
the causal connection between conduct and effects and in the problem of
presenting cases to a jury."
The traditional terminology by which the law designated such conduct as that referred to, designated harms that were equally trivial, and
expressed the causal connection between other acts and harms whichnot being trivial-were important in law, was certainly an utterly imperfect instrument for the analysis of cause, the expression of thought,
or the instruction of juries. There is here no intent to discuss legal
cause, 7 beyond commenting briefly upon defects in terminology which
are obvious upon superficial consideration of certain words; and this is
done in order to make clear the enormous advance made by the Restatement in sweeping away all the old terminology-thus testifying that
such terminology was neither an essential part of the law nor desirable.
On legal cause only a few words may be ventured. Time has no
relation to it except to indicate that of an act which originates" it, or to
mark the moment when one cause concurs with another. Place has no
relation to it whatever. It is natural to think of it as a physical "force",
and seemingly no better analogy is available, but it is not therefore to
be thought of as running straight or crookedly as through a conduit, or
as sharing the locality of persons and things that successively affect or
are affected by it. It is not subject to deflection, as by switches; nor
35. 2 Taunt. 314 (C.P. 1810). Defendant placed lime rubbish on the edge of
highway, wind raised from it dust that frightened plaintiff's horse, which nearly
collided with a wagon passing in the opposite direction on the other side of the
road; to avoid that plaintiff, seemingly unskillfully, drove into other rubbish placed
by X at the same side of the road as defendant's, and was overthrown and injured.
The Lord Justice charged, at 316, that "if there was blameable negligence" of defendant, the verdict should be for plaintiff; but if the accident was due to plaintiff's
lack of skill, or was mere "accident" (if placing the rubbish "before the door was no
more than a person would do in the usual course of business"), defendant should
have the verdict. Verdict was for defendant, and a motion was made for a new trial,
for misdirection. In refusing this, the Chief Justice suggested that defendant's act was
"too remote"; and Lawrence, J. added, "The immediate and proximate cause is the
unskilfulness of the driver."
36. An increasing ability to make such distinctions in important fields, such as
those of industrial accidents and bodily injuries, has been the result of increasing
knowledge in medicine and engineering. See Goodnow, Emotional Disturbances
as Legal Damages, 20 MicHr. L. REv. 497 (1922).
Our growing consciousness of difficulty is reflecting in the sharpening distinctions between the words "effect", "result", "sequel", and "aftermath".
37. Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARv. L. Rev. 103, 223,
303 (1911); Terry, Proximate Consequences in the Law of Torts, 28 HAMW. L.
Rev. 10 (1915) ; Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act, 33 HAv. L. REv.
633 (1920); Edgerton, Legal Cause, 72 U. OF PA. L. Rev. 211, 343 (1924);
McLaughlin, Proximate Cause, 39 H.,av. L. Rm. 149 (1925); L. Green, Contributory Negligence and Proximate Cause, 6 N.C.L. Rev. 3 (1927); Carpenter, Workable
Rules for Determining Proximate Cause, 20 CLT.n'. L. REv. 229, 396, 471 (1932).
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to neutralization by a counter force. It is a logical conception, and it
would seemingly have been proper to consider it as operating consistently, persistently, and undeviatingly. Whatever may be its consequences, it would seem that they must be direct. To speak of a cause
in that sense as operating directly or indirectly, of only a particular
cause as "direct", of one cause as being more or less "proximate" than
another to the effect they concur in producing, or to speak of one cause
being "superseded" by another when both are operating toward the
same end, is to introduce figures of speech into matter that calls for
inartificial and logical treatment. Mr. Beale was surely correct in thinking of a wholly satisfactory legal cause as one "logically direct, direct
in causal sequence" ;"' but to call it, because of its having those qualities,
"proximate"-a word of obviously different meaning-was quite a
different matter. The cases have not allowed him or other commentators to abide long with logic.
The word "remote" was presumably current when Bacon framed
his maxim, in jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur. It has
been generally understood as referring to remoteness in place or time of
the wrongful act, 9 but the adjective has probably most often been used,
as Bacon used it, to qualify the cause that originates in the act. When
remoteness is attributed to harm, act, or cause its meaning is almost
always that of triviality or negligibility. 40 If a harm is very plainly the
38. Supra note 37, at 642.
39. As used supra note 35 by Chief Justice Mansfield.
No attention seems to have been paid to the origin and original meaning of
Bacon's maxim. He took from Aristotle a conviction "that true knowledge is
knowledge of causes"; adopted from the schoolmen their simplified version of
Aristotle's division of causes-namely into proximate and remote; and made proximate cause the subject for his scientific examination of law and other fields of
knowledge. See Green, Proximate and Remote Cause, 4 AMr. L. REv. 201. Mr.
Green shows the above and much more by quotations from Bacon's writings. He
says of the meaning of the terms: "A proximate cause is one in which is involved
the idea of necessity. It is one the connection between which and the effect is plain
and intelligible. . . . A remote cause is a cause the connection between which and
the effect is uncertain, vague or indeterminate. . . . This idea of necessity-the
necessary connection between the cause and the effect-is the prime distinction between a proximate and a remote cause"-at 204. He quotes from the schoolmen:
"By the remote cause is not meant something which is the cause of a cause, or the
cause of several causes" (Occam) ; "whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause
of the effect"-that is, the "proximate cause"; "a cause is said to be remote . . .
when neither in its existence nor in its power is it joined to its effect" (Burgersdyk,
o s LOGIcAE was a textbook at Oxford and Cambridge)-at 206,
whose INSnTUTION
207. According to Mr. Green, all this was common knowledge in Bacon's day. He
points out that time and space had nothing to do with the distinction between remote and proximate causes- at 205. Mr. Green's writings were reprinted in
EsSAYS AND NoTEs ON THE LAW OF TORT AND CRIME (1933).

40. Mr. Bohlen recognized both meanings (and also threw light on the difference
of view, next referred to in the text, between Chief Justice Mansfield and Lord
Campbell) in the following comment: "How can it be said that any result is the
legal consequence of an act which the law deems so far removed, whether by reason
of its lack-of actual proximity or because of any principle limiting legal liability for
actually proximate results,"-here referring, in a third sense, to the harm--"that it
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effect of an act, the former has ordinarily been called the "direct" consequence and the latter the "direct" cause. When the connection between the act and the harm was not so obvious, but satisfactorily
demonstrable, either one or the other was described as "proximate".
But if it was very difficult to trace a causal connection, or it seemed desirable to dismiss the harm as trivial, it was common in older cases to
dismiss this as "consequential", or "merely consequential". Thus,
within the entire field of consequences, the quality of being consequential was, in words, ascribed with dumbfounding irrationality solely to
the situation in which it was most difficult to prove the sequence, or in
which though assumedly proved it was nevertheless to be ignored.
This usage is today not wholly unknown, and is preserved in various
statutes. Each of the words just mentioned has been involved in more
or less confusion.
"Remote" has perhaps been subject to least misunderstanding.
The mere date of an act cannot possibly affect its effectiveness as a
cause of harm; remoteness in time may, however, increase the difficulties of proof-which often are included, like other irrelevancies, in
discussions of causation. Even when not used in a temporal sense the
word has not always been used to indicate the legal negligibility of an
act. Lord Campbell, for example, seemingly thought that the "remoteness" of a plaintiff's contributory negligence might have an important
effect on his case. 4' The phrase "remote cause", constantly used, involved in itself confusion, for although a wrongful act ends when performed and may properly be characterized as remote in time or place
from the alleged result, this is not necessarily true of the cause which
the act originated. Bacon's reference to it is plainly to a cause related
to a wrong presently in litigation; therefore a cause of some present
potency. If intended to refer to a cause once discernible but which had
for practial purposes lost all potency, the phrase would be misleading.
Used as Bacon used it, it clearly implies a comparative judgment berefuses to recognize it as a basis of legal claim or redress against the author of the
alleged cause? Obviously, however, this is merely to state in terms of apparent
causation the limits of legal liability"--Bohlen, supra note 13 at 241 n.1.
41. In Dowell v. General Steam Navigation Co. supra note 26 at 206-immediately following the statement there quoted, and another that he is barred by any
negligence that was "a proximate cause" of an accident, "however much [defendant]
might be in fault"--he added: "In some cases there may have been negligence on the
part of a plaintiff remotely connected with the accident; and in these cases the question arises, whether the defendant by the exercise of ordinary care and skill might
have avoided the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of the plaintiff, as in the
often quoted Donkey case, Davies v. Mann." Here, (1) the reference to the act in
Davies v. Mann as remote is curious; (2) he seemingly implied that when plaintiff's
negligence was "a proximate cause" not even defendant's failure to utilize a last
opportunity could enable plaintiff to recover; but (3) when plaintiff's act was "remotely connected with" his own harm liability could nevertheless be put upon defendant in the manner stated.
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tween causes operating concurrently in causing the harm in litigation.
Unless proximate is given some wholly artificial meaning it is obvious
-that "there may be two or more proximate causes of an injury." 42 To
begin with, then, "remote" is read as merely "less immediate"-which
is an enormous alteration. In that form the rule became, in Jeremiah
Smith's words, "productive of infinite confusion and error"."
The
less immediate, or earlier, cause being disregarded, and the more proximate treated as the sole cause, gave rise to the last wrongdoer rule.
But proximate was given various other meanings. One was that no
cause, or "not too many" causes could have intervened between the
actor's wrongful conduct and the harm under consideration. Another
made it synonymous with "natural and probable cause". So many
situations were supposedly explainable by it,4 4 that "proximate cause"
became very generally accepted as the equivalent of all "legal cause".
Nearly every other word used in stating rules of causation therefore
became synonymous with proximate-that is, as some employed them. 45
When the situations referred to are eliminated from the rule it becomes
essentially one of liability for reasonably probable harm, since the original rule of eliminating less immediate causes was discredited by developments of the last wrongdoer application, 4 and a supposed test of
reasonable foreseeability likewise lost some favor.4 7 One peculiar result
in some jurisdictions where a defendant is liable for all proximate consequences and proximity is tested by foreseeability, will be referred to
later.
The word "direct" was often used indistinguishably from proximate. It implies that a cause can also operate indirectly-and of course
the physical consequences of the original wrongful act are generally
spoken of as direct or indirect. Assuming that causes can be or can
operate similarly, what connection is there between the effectiveness of
the cause and that distinction? Direct "forces" have been defined as
operating without the intervention of any other force between the
-wrongful act and the resultant harm, all other "forces" (causes) as
indirect; and it was assumed that the latter could "come to rest . .
in a dangerous position" or in "a position of apparent safety" unless
42. L. Green, upra note 37, at 12.
43. J. Smith, supra note 37, at 106.
44. See Carpenter, supra note 37, at 246-55; Green, supra note 37, at 7 et seq.
45. See, for a list, McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 196 and n.117; Edgerton,
upra note 37, at 213.
46. See text infra at note 118.
47. McLaughlin, supra note 37, at 166; Carpenter, supra note 37, at 238 et seq.;
Smith, supra note 37, at 245-52, 303 et seq. See also, STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF
LEGAL LIABILrry 116, 451 (1906).
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"some new force combines with this condition to create harm"." The
definition of "direct" is one possible definition; the assumptions respecting "indirect" causes seem to be wholly imaginary. In very common usage direct had the meaning of relative immediacy in time or
space to the harm-the inartificial meaning of proximate. But here
again this immediacy cannot of itself affect the potency of the cause;
it only makes the connection clearer and the proof easier that the blameworthy act was the cause. This was really the ordinary meaning of the
word. The important thing to note is that the idea of effectiveness, of
the relative significance or insignificance of the cause, is wholly absent
from the word's connotation.
Its absence disastrously affected legal thinking. This cannot be
better illustrated than by Holdsworth's History, in which the word
"direct" in its temporal sense controlled the interpretation of every part
of the law of civil liability. The cases which would be apposite in this
connection are legion, but merely to select a few for discussion would
be open to a suspicion of undue selection, and to analyze more than a
few is impracticable. A consideration of Holdsworth's treatment of
the subject can be briefer, and covers the entire field. He read into
medieval cases " in which recovery was denied to plaintiff when the
harm was caused by his own act the interpretation that his act was the
direct or proximate cause of the harm, and defined those words as
meaning that such act was subsequent in time to defendant's-a restriction which, though we have always used the same words of causation,
is repudiated by the Restatement. It is true that Holdsworth's intent
(perhaps always undesirable in writing history) was merely to state
the medieval principle "in the terms of the new phraseology"."0 However, that phraseology seemingly had not in England the meaning he
gave it-and certainly had not in the United States; the assumed meaning was not shown to apply to the medieval facts; and thus to the obscurity of the past there were added terminological doubts of the present.
These terms "direct" and "proximate", as descriptions of causation, were latecomers in the law. It is difficult to see how there could
have been any idea in the medieval rule of non-recovery other than
that of placing liability on him by whose act, practically considered, a
48. Beale supra note 37, at 641, 650. Mr. McLaughlin calls this "natural causation" (supra note 37, at 184), but why nature should be thus restricted is a puzzle;
apparently "simple," the causation may be very complex.
49. Supra at note 12. Similarly: the doctrine that, "if the plaintiff's act was
the proximate cause of the damage, the plaintiff could not recover, was well established mediaeval doctrine, and wholly consonant with the mediaeval principles of
civil liability"--8 HoLDSWORTn, HsSToaY 459; "if my negligent act is the direct or im-

mediate or proximate cause of the damage, I cannot recover"--Id at 460.
50. Ibid, speaking of the nineteenth century doctrine of contributory negligence,
and also describing it quite correctly as "the disguise of the new phraseology."
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harm was done; that is, of applying to the plaintiff the general rule of
liability that made every man responsible for his acts. In his earliest
references to the rule Holdsworth described plaintiff's act as "the effective cause of the damage which he has suffered". 51 In the medieval
cases which he then or later cited on the point plaintiff's fault was more
than merely substantial; it was decisive.5 2 He also quoted "' as equivalents of his "direct cause" description the characterization by Bayley,
J. of plaintiff's act in Butterfield v. Forrester:"the accident appeared to
happen entirely from his own fault" ;4 Baron Parke's statement in
Bridge v. Grand Junction Railway Company: "if by ordinary care he
might have avoided [the consequences of defendant's negligence], he is
the author of his own wrong" ;55 and the pondered statement of the
Exchequer Chamber in Tuff v. Warman that a direct cause is one by
which plaintiff "so far contributed to the misfortune . . . that but
for such negligence on his part, the misfortune would not have happened"5 6 -which certainly must be understood to mean, would not
have happened in substantially the same amount and manner.5" Now,
in the first of these cases plaintiff's contributory negligence consisted in
not utilizing a last opportunity to avoid all harm; and in the second
Baron Parke expressed his belief that no contributory negligence less
than failure to make reasonable utilization of such an opportunity should
ever suffice to bar recovery by plaintiff. In other words, the "direct
cause" contributed by plaintiff in these two cases to his own harm was
a manifestly preponderant moral fault (or "act"); and in the third
51. 3 Id. at 302.
52. (1) Y.B. 10 Edw. IV, Patch pl. 19-action for damages caused by cattle
defendant drove along highway; plea, that plaintiff's land was not properly enclosed,
which defect caused the damage. (2) Y.B. 11 Edw. IV, Trin. pl. 6-(translated)
"if a man sell me a horse and warrants that he has two eyes, which he has not, I
shall have no action of deceit, for I could have known that from the beginning." These
two cases are cited in 3 HOLDSWORTH 301-02. (3) Baily v. Merrel, Cro. Jac. 386
(1606)-action on the case for deceit by a common carrier against a shipper who
understated the weight of goods shipped; held, no recovery because plaintiff could
have weighed goods, "and being his own negligence he is without remedy." This
case is cited in 8 HoLDswoRTiH 459. It is the same case as Baily v. Merrell, 3 Bulst.
95 (1695) which Mr. Bohlen preferred to cite as one of assumption of risk-Bohlen,
supra note 16 at n.43.
53. 8 HOLDsWoRTH 461.
54. See text supra at note 19.
55. Supra, note 27.
56. Tuff v. Warman, 5 C.B. N.S. 573 (1858), 141 Eng. Rep. 231, was a collision
case in which defendant had the last opportunity to avoid the collision. Willes, J.
on ceicuit charged the jury that despite plaintiff's possible negligence he could recover
if that did not contribute "directly" to the collision. Misdirection was alleged in
failing to charge that recovery was impossible if he contributed either "directly or
indirectly." In the Common Pleas argument was primarily on that point. The
court upheld the refusal of a new trial and defined "direct cause." In view of defendant's last opportunity, plaintiff's negligence would not be, it said, a direct cause;
"that is to say, would not be a cause without which the injury would not have
happened" at 586, 141 Eng. Rep. at 236.
57. See text infra at note 77.
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case his contributory cause is implied, at the very least, to be substantial. Under the "direct cause" test plaintiff in Butterfield v. Forrester5s
did not fail because he could, by using ordinary care, have escaped
harm, nor because the violent and reckless manner of his riding made
his harm appear almost wilfully his own act, but only because that act,
being subsequent to defendant's, was the "direct" cause of the harm.
Holdsworth believed that he corrected misunderstandings respecting contributory negligence. Assuming in that modem bar to plaintiff's
recovery a requirement that plaintiff's negligence be last 59 (though
according to the Restatement that was never necessary), and reading
back the same requirement into the medieval rule of non-recovery," he
insisted through decades that the two rules were identical. 6' However,
although within the requirement of "direct" incidence plaintiff's contribution in each case might theoretically be insubstantial, we have noted
above his contrary assumption as respects the medieval rule, whereas
he wrote of the modern rule that in it "the go-by is given to any consideration of the respective seriousness of the negligence of the two
parties, and the court merely looks to see to whose act of negligence
the damage is directly imputable". 62 And no matter what variant
opinions may be entertained as respects the origin of the defense of
contributory negligence, it certainly soon acquired the meaning that
negligence which contributes in any degree to his own injury bars recovery by plaintiff of any damages whatsoever. As a matter of mere
language, "contributory" negligence might seemingly be either trivial
or serious, less or even greater than defendant's in potential harmful58. Supra note 19.
59. "The substance of the defence called 'contributory negligence' is not the fact
that the plaintiff has been negligent; but that his negligent act is the direct cause of
the accident"-8 HOLDSWORTH 461.
60. Referring to a case of 1474, he wrote: "We may note, too, that this case
clearly shows that a man is not liable unless his act is the proximate cause of the
damage"--3 id. 302; it was proximate and preponderant. Again: ". . . the doctrine
that, if the plaintiff's act was the proximate cause of the damage, the plaintiff could
not recover, was well established mediaeval doctrine, and wholly consonant with the
mediaeval principles of civil liability"-8 id. 459.
61. Referring to the medieval rule of non-recovery he wrote in 1909: "this is
exactly the substance and the meaning of that miscalled doctrine 'contributory negligence.' According to this doctrine, when the plaintiff's own act is the effective cause
of the damage which he has suffered, he cannot recover"--3 id. 302. Referring to the
general medieval rule of liability he wrote in 1937 that one illustration of the survival

in modern law of that rule that a man is liable for his "act," "is the technical meaning

of the defence miscalled contributory negligence"-8 id. 459. "That the mediaeval
principle"--of non-recovery-"was, in effect, affirmed in the disguise of the new

phraseology, is clear from the cases of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries"8 id. 460. "In other words, as in the Middle Ages, the defendant, who succeeds on
this plea, escapes because it was not his wrongful act, but the wrongful act of the
plaintiff, which was the direct cause of the accident . . . if his negligence had as
great a share in causing the damage as that of the defendant--4f, for instance, the

negligent acts of the plaintiff and defendant were contemporaneous, he cannot recover"--8 id. 461 (italics added).

62. 8 id. 463.
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ness. But since, in the state of law long existing, plaintiff's lawyer
ought not to bring suit unless he believes negligence by his client to be
non-existent, the assumption seems fair that the word "contributory"
in the great majority of litigated cases has not had the meaning of conducing but, rather, at the utmost, the meaning of a tributary or subservient influence, and when contributory negligence appears, and bars
recovery, it is of that character. This assumption necessarily underlies
all criticism of the defense of contributory negligence as unjust, and the
proposal that it be displaced by an apportionment of the plaintiff's loss
in accord with the respective faults of the parties. In the relatively few
cases in which the plaintiff, despite contributory negligence, recovers
because of defendant's failure to utilize with reasonable competence a
last opportunity to save plaintiff from harm, the decision rests, not upon
the fact that defendant has, literally, the "last" opportunity-though
the Restatement found that requirement in the precedents, 6 8 -but upon
64
the fact that defendant's social fault is more reprehensible.
Holdsworth also attempted, by applying the test of "direct" causation, to clarify the principle of last opportunity, and in so doing ignored
all that is significant in it. In Davies v. Mann, 5 for example, plaintiff
recovered, on this theory, not because defendant could by exercising
ordinary care have saved him from harm, but because of a (supposed)
quirk in legal causation: "there was contributory negligence, but the
defence of contributory negligence was not available, because the defendant's act was subsequent to the plaintiff's, and the direct cause of
the accident."6 6 Since this distinction would apply to every case of last
opportunity, it would remove from our tort law the doctrine which
perhaps best illustrates the fact that legal problems in the field of negligence can be justly settled only by giving special attention to negligence
-the social faults of the respective parties. It happens in last opportunity cases (with particular clarity in the personal injury cases covered
in the Restatement doctrine of last clear chance) that the act that is last
in time also expresses the preponderant moral fault.6 7 But that coincidence is fortuitous. In general, the test of temporal immediacy
is necessarily without reference to fault. In a famous English case
that will again be referred to, plaintiff's intestate, who was plainly
negligent in driving upon a crossing, was killed by a railway car
which defendant's agent endeavored to stop, but vainly because of
63. §§ 479-80 and Comments.
64. Infra page 604.
65. Note 25 supra.
66. 8 HOLDSWORTH 461 n.6 (italics in original). The law, of course, does not
concern itself at all with contributory negligence otherwise than as a bar to recovery.
67. Infra page 599.
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antecedent negligence in not repairing its brakes.6" According to
Holdsworth this was "the first case [1915] in which a plaintiff,
whose negligence was in fact the direct cause of the accident, was allowed to recover. So that . . . this was the first case in which a
comparison of the comparative negligences of the plaintiff and defendant was a real element in the defence". 6 9

Whether this innovation seemed to Holdsworth desirable or undesirable (his position seems obscure 'o) does not concern us. We are
considering merely the usefulness of the word "direct" in a terminology
of causation, and upon this the preceding examination of Holdsworth's
various views certainly throws light. If cause be conceived as a force
or influence which produces a particular effect the phrase "direct"
cause" would most naturally suggest, seemingly, the directness of an
act's impact, or the clarity of connection between cause and effect, and
certainly would have no temporal suggestion. It is therefore difficult
to understand why this last should ever have been given that meaning. 71
For some reason immediacy in time became very generally its superficial
meaning, but since the other conception of an effective influence could
not be excluded it was attached to the phrase by implication-as though
it were equivalent to "last acting effective cause". This is, however,
clear evidence of the inadequacy and undesirability of the phrase, not
of its adequacy. Because the true meaning was only implied the phrase
necessarily tended to divert attention from the relative causal potency
and social reprehensibility of different acts, as is plainly indicated by
Holdsworth's treatment of the subject. In the first place, the wrongful
68. British Columbia Ry. Co. v. Loach, [1916] 7 A.C. 719 discussed infra following note 136.
69. 8 HOLDSwORTH 462. It will be noted that he here attributes "direct" causation to plaintiff's act although defendant's subsequent inaction was nearer in time
to the harm, contrary to the principle of the Restatement.
70. He tells us (8 id. 464), quite justly, that the defence of contributory negligence and the measure of damages for a negligent act (Mspra at note 8) illustrate
"the imperfect way in which the conception of negligence has . . . been reconciled
with earlier conceptions of liability." The question naturally arises whether he desired the conception of social fault to displace, or be displaced by, the conception of
act-and-consequences. A few remarks point to the former view. He condemned
"upon purely logical grounds" (8 id. 463) the rule for the measure of damages, but
accepted it nevertheless as easy of application and, seemingly, desirable (8 id. 464).
He pronounced it, in its disregard of relative faults, to be "comparable to . . . the
defense of contributory negligence" (8 id. 463, supra at note 62). Now, as to the
latter, since he assumed that when the negligence of the two parties are contemporaneous they necessarily cancel each other (8 id. 461 and n.6), and that when
plaintiff's is subsequent in time it is always the effective cause of harm because
"direct," naturally one nowhere finds the defense of contributory negligence condemned as either illogical or unethical. On the whole, if he had any preference,
it would seem to be for the rule of act-and-consequences, from ancient times down
to the present day and into the future, purged of the entanglements with the element
of fault.
71. Possibly it was because, if a course be conceived of as a force or influence,
it was difficult to explain why only causes operating "directly" should be recognized.
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acts required in the medieval precedents to bar plaintiff's recovery were,
as above noted, decisively adequate to account for the harm he suffered;
the fact that Holdsworth used only the word "direct" in its temporal
sense, with only the rarest reference to-and no emphasis upon-the
actual substantive fault, reveals the danger of the phraseology. It is
made clearer by his insistence upon the identity of the medieval rule
and the modem bar of contributory negligence, notwithstanding his
explicit recognition of the complete absence in the latter of any requirement of substantial fault. All this despite the fact that the Restatement
shows no basis whatever in our law, outside the doctrine of last opportunity, for the restricted temporal meaning of "direct". 7
And finally, as respects that doctrine, which he likewise explained
in terms of direct causation, he explicitly denied that the decisions between 1809 and 1915 were doctrinally grounded upon comparative
fault, although that is obviously their justification, and the order of
negligences merely establishes the preponderance of defendant's fault.
Still another objection to "direct cause" applied to acts rather than
faults as the basis of liability, is revealed in the above quotation. In
every case of last opportunity defendant's negligence is a.failure to act.
It is inaction that subjects him to liability. Holdsworth refers to comparative "negligences" but refers to plaintiff's act as the "direct cause".
A conception of cause as a force which only positive action can produce
is obviously narrow, and obviously inconsistent with the cases. In the
Restatement provisions on last clear chance 7 the word "cause" is not
used. Why is liability there placed on defendant? Is it because his
fault preponderates over the "cause" attributed sub silentio to plaintiff's
"act"? Or because defendant's inaction is likewise a cause and preponderant? Or because only faults are considered, and his fault, fully
defined, is dominant?
However, the ambiguity of the traditional phraseology of causation was perhaps not so great a defect as its scantiness. The terms
available were wholly inadequate to afford dependable distinctions; they
were too few to be precise even if they had not been inherently ambiguous.7 4

No judicial decision was precise until re-expressed in terms

relative to act and harm. One result of dependence upon an imperfect
terminology was that even the meaning of "cause" became ambiguous.
As a thoughtful writer has said, it "may be a conlusion as to legal responsibility stated as if it were a reason leading to that conclusion, or
72. See note 20 mtpra.
73. §§ 479-480.
74. Compare the discussion of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption
of risk in Bohlen, supra note 13, at 245-51; and cases cited by HOLDSWORTH, mspra
note 52.
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it may connote greater blameworthiness. The former is a common
The latter, when sepfactor in all the legal uses of the word...
arable from the former, is . . . peculiar to last clear chance cases"."
What could not, perhaps, be done while the law was developing was
done in the Restatement.76 In not one of the sections in the volume on
Negligence and chapter on Causation does one find the words "remote,"
"direct," or "proximate." One does find "superseding cause", but
always explicitly stated as a phrase describing "legal causation"-that
is, artificial causation-and in situations, within legal causation, clearly
illustrating a just and sensible public policy. It starts with the general
principle that an actor's negligence cannot be "a legal cause" of a harm
unless it is "a substantial factor in bringing about the harm".
The definition of "substantial" evidently gave much difficulty; it
is, in effect, whatever a jury pronounces to be substantial in the general
sense of that word as defined in the dictionaries."7 Various practical
suggestions are then added for guidance in determining what is a "substantial" cause. The Restatement then proceeds to state the rules governing liability for harms-incidentally illustrating their nature and
extent-for which a negligent actor is liable when his conduct is a substantial cause thereof. It next deals with the act of a third person, "or
other force", following the actor's negligent conduct, which may relieve
him of liability; again listing practical considerations which afford aid
in answering the question whether a particular intervening force "is"
(that is, should be regarded as) a superseding cause; follows with various concrete examples of factors not to be treated as such, and a few
which either are, or, under stated conditions, may be so treated; and
then deals at length with particular rules of causal relation which affect
solely the extent and not the existence of liability-whereas all preceding affected both; and all these special situations relate to the nature
and extent of the harms for which liability may exist.
In short, for the partially misleading and wholly inadequate terminology of "cause" theretofore used in judicial opinions-and which the
75. Maclntyre, The Rationale of Last Clear Chance, 53 HARV. L. Rav. 1225,
1226 (1940).
76. What follows relates to §§430-53, dealing with the causal relation that
creates liability (general principles, §§430-34---note the small number; rules determining a negligent actor's responsibility for harm, §§ 435-39; superseding cause,
§§ 440-53 and on §§ 454-61, which deal with the causal relation affecting extent,
but not existence, of liability.
77. In the official Comment a on § 431 it is stated that the word is "used to
denote the fact that the defendant's conduct has such an effect in producing the harm
as to lead reasonable men to regard it as a cause; using that word in the popular
sense in which there always lurks the idea of responsibility, rather than in the socalled 'philosophic sense,' which includes every one of the great number of events
without which any event would not have occurred." The credit for this summation
of what the law requires goes to Jeremiah Smith, supra note 37, at 308 et seq.
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Restatement discarded as neither a part of the law nor desirable-it has
substituted a very few general principles of causation and has then illustrated the operation of these in many precisely stated situations relating to the actor's "wrongful conduct" (again preferring the concrete
act to the abstract "fault") or the resultant harm. No doubt all this
was what counsel had always struggled to get before juries; and, indeed,
what judges had sought to convey in the obscure phraseology of precedents they were bound to copy.
The clarification of principles effected by the Restatement is enormous, and nobody examining it can miss the point that the improvement
derives from concentrating attention upon precise situations of act and
harm, in connection with each of which the existence of cause is either
assumed or denied in a pronouncement of the legal responsibility of one
or the other party. Certainly juries could never have been intelligently
guided to verdicts by instructions couched in the old terminology, and
now can be guided by the distinctions presented in the Restatement.
Despite the improvements made by this, however, there are good
reasons why the preceding discussion of the old terminology seemed
necessary. The Restatement is not, and the old cases are, the law. As
a result of the Restatement better opinions and decisions will follow,
but until they displace the old the latter will of necessity be cited and
quoted. The main reason is, however, that the inconsistencies between
liability based on fault and liability based on acts are inconsistencies in
the law-that is, in the cases. Moreover, although necessarily not at
all removed by the Restatement, its language does not so readily reveal
these inconsistencies, and an examination of them beginning with it
would not make the significance of the distinction between act and fault
so plain as it appears when traced from its origin onward. The fact
that all the Restatement's pronouncements upon the legal responsibilities
of the parties are made in relation to precisely stated forms of wrongful conduct, makes it an admirable basis for consideration of the
changes which would result in the law if a direct appraisal of the wrong,
and not of the consequences ascribed to the conduct under artificial
rules of legal causation, were made the basis of liability.
Most important in connection with our definite problem of apportionment is the fact that the Restatement has of necessity in no way
affected the law respecting the bar of contributory negligence, which
would disappear if statutory provision should be made for loss apportionment in negligence cases. On the other hand, it of course preserves
certain limitations upon that bar which have been prescribed by general
legislation 78 or, in specific situations of frequent occurrence, by general
78. §§ 285 (a) 475(a).
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judicial law. 79 It has also recognized as generally established law a
portion of the precedents, on last opportunity. It remains to consider
these two doctrines before passing to consideration of the desirability
and feasibility of a statutory remedy.
It is true that the decision in Butterfield v. Forresteraroused no
controversy when decided, 8 and taking it as introducing the defense
of contributory negligence that is surprising unless, as Holdsworth
contended, it was understood as stating traditional law.8 ' Nevertheless,
so taking it, it has already been seen that in its total disregard of the
parties' relative fault the defense of contributory negligence had no
background in the law; it was a sudden and enormous break with tradition. Be it noted, then, that it has had only a brief history in the
development of civil liability. A proposal that it be eliminated is no
attack on an ancient common law principle. Its prominence, and its ill
effects, have been due to the great number of accidents in an industrial
age.
Returning to its innovative character, its derivation has been generally regarded as a complete mystery. It had no analogy in Roman
law nearer than assumption of risk, 82 and is wholly without parallel in
Though greatly resembling in its early
modern civil law systems.'
applications (less so in many harsh applications in later development)
equity's denial of relief to a complainant whose conduct was "unclean"
in respect to the very matter of his petition, Lord Ellenborough, who
presided over the court in which the case which assumedly first pronounced the doctrine was decided, was certainly one of those least
likely of all judges of his time to have borrowed a principle of chancery.
Mr. Bohlen has shown, also, that refusal of relief to one of joint tortfeasors could not be the root of the doctrine.84 It was said by Pollock
79. §§ 285 (b), 475 (a), 468 et seq.
80. Bohlen, supra note 13 at 233.
81. If in the defense of "contributory negligence" reference had actually been
made to, and emphasis placed upon, the fault (negligence) that would be the best
reason for rejecting Holdsworth's identification of the modern rule and the medieval
rule of non-recovery. But, though the Restatement requires "substantial" influence
the cases have certainly not required that it approach in causal potency defendant's
act. Therefore the name "contributory negligence" cannot be taken, as has been
suggested, as indicating a turning of men's minds to the element of fault in liability.
Holdsworth assumed that-because of the name a re-examination of the old doctrines
was compelled, that it was intended to be reaffirmed, hence their identity-8 HoLDswORTH 460. The name, was however, adopted after the new doctrine had been introduced and thereafter recognized, and nothing in the period of emergence indicates
the re-examination of the medieval rule. The truth seems to be that both rules rest
liability on an act, but that in the medieval rule an act of decidedly effective character
was assumed, and in the modern rule it is not required.
82. Bohlen, supra note 13, at 252 n.2, 253 n.2.
83. The Scotch and Quebec Law are discussed by MacIntyre, supra note 75,
at 1236-38, 1240-41.
84. Bohlen, mpra note 13, at 242-43.
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long ago that the name of the doctrine suggests "that a man who does
not take ordinary care for his own safety is to be in a manner punished
for his carelessness by disability to sue any one else whose carelessness
was concerned in producing the damage."8' 5 Lord Ellenborough had
long before made a remark much to the same effect.8" These remarks
may have led Mr. Bohlen to suggest that the doctrine was an expression
of English individualism, resting with consent and assumption of risk
on "the same individualistic view as to the proper province of private
law"; and that the occasion for its appearing when it did was "the
enormous growth of protective duties" which the courts were asked to
enforce when England became highly industrialized early in the 1800s.
"Unless each man was to be regarded as his brother's keeper .

.

. it

was necessary that the correlative duty of self-protection should be extended"; "the courts are the last resort of him who not merely does not,
but cannot, protect himself."817 All this is extremely plausible, but no
proof can be given.
If the suggested explanation of the doctrine's origin be correct, it
should not be ignored in considering a proposal to abrogate it in consequence of altered social conditions and ideals now prevailing.
Professor Bohlen long ago pointed out that the general principles
of legal causation admit of no modification which, without utterly repudiating their basic ideas, will explain the bar of contributory negligence.8 8 As he said of that doctrine:
"it applies only in particular cases and between parties litigant to
destroy a chain of causation sufficient to render the defendants
prima facie liable, and it regards an act already seen to be a sufficient link in the chain of legal causation, as a break therein, not
because any new fact has altered its actual position in the sequence
of events, not even because of some newly discovered legal characteristic, but simply because the person legally responsible therefor is seeking compensation for the harm it has aided in bringing
on him. This is not a modification of the original conception of
legal proximity; it is an entirely new and antagonistic principle.
The one deals with the relation of fact to fact as facts, the other
concerns itself with the merits and demerits of the authors thereof
as parties litigant".8 9
If "it would be obviously opposed to any possible conception of
justice that any one should be required to answer for a harm unless he
85. POLuocl, THE LAW OF TORTS 374 (1st ed. 1886).
86. See text at note 19 supra.
87. Bohlen, mtpra note 13, at 253, 254. He quotes Lord Kenyon's remark, in
1789, that "when common prudence and caution of man are sufficient to guard him
the law will not protect him in his negligence" (id. 253), seemingly as a statement,
substantially, of the defense of contributory negligence.
88. Id. at 234-42.

89. Id. at 240.
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had actually caused it" 9o-and no one, presumably, will assert the contrary-the bar of contributory negligence must with equal obviousness
work an injustice in the vast majority of litigated cases, in which the
plaintiff's contributory negligence is only a minor cause. In order to
narrow its operation two devices were resorted to by the courts. These
were more fundamental than various situational exceptions to the operation of the rule; they altered the meaning of negligence and the imputation of fault. Since both were plainly instrumentalities of a fuller justice
they could not, even in their origin, have been properly characterized
as evasions of the rule in a depreciatory sense of that word, and they
long since became established limitations upon it.
Before considering these, mere reference may be made to certain
devices which had the contrary effect of strengthening the bar of contributory negligence, and which were, at least originally and in the main,
judicially established. They are known as specific-situation standards,
and have played an important part in railroad and automobile litigation.
Manifestly, a question whether plaintiff did as much to protect himself
as an ordinarily prudent man would have done would be a question for
the jury. But when the circumstances fell within some specific rule of
caution ("stop, look, and listen" for example) the plaintiff might, on
clear evidence, be ruled negligent as matter of law, and a verdict for
defendant directed-assuming a decision, also, that plaintiff's negligence
was a legally contributive cause (which is the court's function when
not in doubt)."' A student friendly to the defense of contributory negligence and to these devices has found evidence of their lessening use, or
effectiveness." Such standards, whether judicial or statutory (such as
fixing the right of way at crossings) simplify litigation, and if they
could be fixed with equality for both parties they might be very desirable.
As respects both defendant and plaintiff the court determinesfrom the facts admitted, found by special verdict, "or reasonably inferable from the evidence"-whether defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing harm to plaintiff, unless that is open to reasonable
doubt, in which the question "is to be left" to the jury. The court
also has power to determine as to each party whether there exists the
causal relation necessary to impose liability on one or bar recovery by
the other." These are very great powers, and if it is fair to assume that
90. Id. at 234.
91. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §434 (1934).
92. R. M. Nixon, Changing Rules of Liability in Automobile Accident Litigation,
3 LAW & CONTEMP PROB. 476 (1936). He refers to them as rules "by Which [a
judge] might rescue the defendant front the fault judgmnent of a hostile jury"--at
481 (italics added).
93. RESTATEMENT, §§ 434-476.
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judges will rarely be unduly distrustful of their opinions in exercising
them, then restraint should certainly be exercised in any judicial action
outside of them. The members of the American Law Institute, in approving what the authors of the Restatement wrote, tell us that:
"While the function of the court in dealing with negligence
and contributory negligence is the same, it is often differently exercised. Courts frequently define the standard of self-protective care
to which a plaintiff must conform to a degree of particularity to
which they rarely define the standard to which a defendant must
conform. Thus, in situations which frequently recur courts often
declare that particular acts of a sort often done by plaintiffs amount
to contributory negligence, although they leave to the jury the
determination
whether similar acts done by defendants are negli94
gent."
This turning to duties, toward one's self or others, is obviously a
turning toward emphasis upon fault. Moreover, let it be noted that
such instructions, as understood by those who approved the Restatement, are judgments of comparative fault. Obviously, too, the specific
situation rules themselves, though in form relating to acts, represent
the same emphasis, for the acts are assumedly of a particularly reprehensible character. As respects the judicial charges to which the above
quotation refers-in effect assuming that the plaintiff's duty (not
merely his instinct) of self preservation is greater than defendant's duty
to protect others-they raise various interesting problems. They are
certainly not good ethics, and according to the Restatement they are
not good law, for it declares that "It is not contributory negligence for
a plaintiff to expose himself to danger in a reasonable effort to save a
third person or the land or chattels of himself or a third person from
harm." "' And it further provides, in general, that "in determining
whether the conduct of a plaintiff amounts to contributory negligence,
the fact that his only alternative is a course of conduct which involves
a risk of harm to a third person is a factor to be considered." 96 Even
as a matter of fact it is not at all certain, fortunately, that emphasis upon
thought for one's self, when danger is realized, fairly represents average
human conduct; in many particular situations we all know that it does
not.17 But in the general run of contributory negligence cases no dan94. Id. Comment a on §476. See also Mr. Bohlen's remarks on- Schlemmer
v. R.R., 207 Pa. 198, 56 AUt. 417 (1903)-Bohlen, smipra note 13 at 251 n.1.
95. § 472 (italics added).
96. § 471. The same provision is made as respects defendant's negligence-§ 295.
See Comments on all three sections.
97. Mr Bohlen remarked that "The duty of care for others manifestly should
be no higher than the duty of self-protection," and added that to hold otherwise
would ".

.

. unduly burden business-rob of self-reliance . . . enervate and emascu-

late and effect pauperize--everybody," apparently since everybody (including busi-
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ger to others is realized; plaintiff's conduct-like his conduct in accidents involving himself alone--is one of mere inadvertence, complete
self-forgetfulness."" If relative duties and faults are to be consideredand if one considers the social interests involved, such as that of lessening accidents-how can a plaintiff's duty to protect himself possibly be
regarded as approaching that which should rest upon a defendant whose
business requires the constant operation of dangerous instrumentalities
such as a street car or a railroad locomotive or an automobile?
Turning now to the two relatively fundamental devices that weakened the bar of contributory negligence, the first arose from the fact
that the defense was never available to an intentional wrongdoer; not
even when the plaintiff's negligence made defendant's wrongful act
possible. 9 The courts, then, extended the meaning of intentional conduct to cover "wanton" or "willful" conduct. Sometimes, too, the
phrase "gross negligence" was used with the same meaning-seemingly
not with impropriety as a descriptive term of unusual fault."" So, in
the Restatement negligence is now defined as "any conduct, except conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others, which falls below
the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm."''
Thus though reckless conduct is not
brought under "intent," neither is it left under "negligence" by exclusion from intent, and plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a bar to
recovery from a defendant who so acts. 0 2
The other meliorative doctrine was that of last opportunity. With
respect to removal of the bar of contributory negligence the rule introduced was: that notwithstanding contributory negligence of the plaintiff
he might recover if the defendant had and neglected to utilize, a last
opportunity by using ordinary care to avoid injuring plaintiff .'3
This principle of last opportunity was not restricted to situations
of threatened harm to the person of a human being. The leading case
on the subject involved damage to property. 0 4 In the Restatement it is
ness men) would be the recipients of protection. He concludes that "it is only
where there is equal ability, equal opportunity to avert the harm that this applies"Bohlen, supra note 13 at 254-55, 256. But the final concession was limited in his
mind to the situations of personal danger covered by the last clear chance doctrine
of §§ 479-80.
98. Compare Comments b and g of § 466 of the RESTATEMENT.
99. RESTATEMENT § 481.
100. Cases are cited in BOHLEN, CASES ON TORTS 529 et seq. (3d ed. 1930) also
in Bohlen, supra note 13 at 259, nn.1, 2.
101. RESTATEMENT § 282.
102. Id. § 482; compare §§ 500-03.
103. A large collection of cases is available in 92 A.L.R. 48 (1934). General
reviews of the doctrine are available in the articles of James, supra note 34, and
MacIntyre, supra note 75.
104. Supra note 25.
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in words, limited under the name of last clear chance to personal injuries,"1° as the only portion of the doctrine established by general law.
Since contributory negligence is in logic and practice as broad as negligence, 06 it is regrettable that the doctrine of last opportunity, which
within its limited availability is to some degree 107 curative of the harshness of the bar of contributory negligence, should be less broad in scope.
Moreover, even so far as it is recognized by the Restatement there is
another marked restriction upon it which is not present in the contributory negligence that bars recovery. Mr. Bohlen, it has been noted, pronounced the latter doctrine wholly unexplainable by the rules of legal
causation, 0 8 and it has also been noted that it completely ignores the
comparative faults of the parties. 0 9 On the other hand, as will soon
appear, the doctrine of last clear chance in the Restatement is an imperfect expression of a judgment of comparative faults. The imperfection derives from the inclusion of a requirement supposedly inherent
in rules of legal causation-namely, that defendant's power to save
plaintiff must not only be greater than plaintiff's power to save himself
but also available later in time, though plaintiff's contributory negligence may precede, follow, or be contemporaneous with defendant's
negligence.11 Now, this aspect of the principle of contributory negligence is manifestly consistent with the nature of fault (which cannot
depend on time), notwithstanding that the principle as a whole ignores
the parties' comparative faults. As regards legal causation, if its general
rules permit this disregard of time in contributory negligence, they
cannot, logically, have required the time restriction in the doctrine of
last clear chance. If, on the other hand, legal cause is a matter of precedent or special policy in each compartment of negligence,"' it is to be
hoped that (so long as the bar of contributory negligence remains in
105. §§ 479-80.
106. Id. §§ 281-83, 463-64 and Comments g on § 281, b on § 463, a on §464.
107. Mr. James has expressed the view that Davies v. Maim stands merely
for the principle stated by Holdsworth, supra note 66: that plaintiff recovered because his negligence was not last in time, therefore not the "direct cause," and hence
did not fall within the defense of contributory negligence. He then adds: "The
rule"-of last opportunity-"is a limitation which inheres in the defense of contributory negligence itself (rather than one which avoids the effect of contributory negligence) and the limitation is a logical application of the medieval principle" of nonrecovery. After thus adopting Holdsworth's ideas in toto he proceeds: "It is amusing
to see how this faithfulness to an older orthodoxy was branded as novel and heretical
by later writers who had come naively to assume that the defense of contributory
negligence, in its unspoiled original simplicity, extended to any fault on the plaintiff's part, and necessarily was a total bar to his action"--James, supra note 34,
at 707. He also borrows Bohlen's characterization of the last opportunity doctrine
as "archaic"'
108. See note 88 supra.
109. See text at note 62 supra.
110. RESTATEMENT § 478.
111. See text at note 13 supra.
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the law) the recognition by the Restatement of the time restriction in
last clear chance will not prevent the development of law to the contrary.
Mr. Bohlen was convinced, years before he drafted the Restatement,
that "it is the sequence in time of the successive negligences which is
vital.""' 2 But he recognized frankly a few years later that jurisdictions
not accepting that requirement were free to proceed with the elimination
from the last-opportunity doctrine of another element which-along
with the time restriction-prevents it from resting squarely on a judgment of relative faults. 31
If last opportunity, whatever its limitation as respects the nature
of the interest invaded, has as its objective the nullification of the bar
of contributory negligence, the defendant would always be the party
with whom it would be concerned. There was no reason in logic, however, why it should not have developed as merely a fault, of peculiar
character and gravity, of which either party might be guilty, and with
correspondingly serious consequences to the one guilty. Such, we have
seen, was precisely what Baron Parke, with three decades of the cases
-involving contributory negligence and last opportunity in mind, understood the latter doctrine to be." 4 A Canadian lawyer, discussing the
development of the doctrine in English law, has said that:
"the courts proceeded to apply it with impartiality to plaintiff and
defendant alike, with the result that notwithstanding the negligence of A, B as defendant would be liable for the whole loss, or
[A] as plaintiff would be unable to recover, if he"-whichever
party-"could with ordinary care have avoided the accident. The
step from this was easy to the cases where negligence prior in point
of time was held not to have contributed; and the hunt for the ultimate negligence was now on . .
This search has been complicated . . . by decisions that negligence might remain ulti-

mate, because continuing, although in fact originally antecedent
: * . and the search for the proximate cause in this special sense
is tending more and more to exclude from consideration all the
other contributory causes' which might fairly be thought to entail
a share of the liability.""
This is a perfectly fair statement of the absurdities to which reliance
upon legal causation leads in attempting to deal with the doctrine; it
was written in defense of a bill providing for division of loss in contributory negligence cases.
112. Bohlen, mtpra note 16, at 243.
113. See infra page 606. Mr. Bohlen did not, to be sure, refer to the doctrine of
fault. Nor is there anything to indicate that he had given thought to the confusion
between act and fault in negligence liability.
114. Supra, note 27.
115. I take the quotation from GREGORY, LEGIsLATIVE Loss DisnmunoN IN
NEGL GENCE AcmoNs 127, 128 (1936).
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To appreciate how consideration of the fault elements in contributory negligence and last opportunity can be displaced by preoccupation
with a rule of legal causation it is instructive to note Mr. Bohlen's attitude toward both doctrines. Reference has already been made to his
suggestion that the introduction of the defense of contributory negligence was an "exhibition of the individualism of the common law,
which exhibits itself in other fields in the doctrines of consent and voluntary assumption of risk.""" There is indeed an individualism of
"the law" in all these cases, and in the last two an actual individualism
justifies the attribution of a willingness to bear the risk. In contributory negligence the individualism is peculiar, and wholly of judicial
origin."' The suggestion, however, was very likely quite sound,
though not elaborated. On the other hand, Mr. Bohlen argued that
both the defense of contributory negligence and the principle of last
opportunity were latent in another doctrine that was prevalent in the
early 1800s and was applied in 1806 in Vicars v. Wilcocks by Lord
Ellenborough." 8 The doctrine of last clear chance in that case made a
third person whose supervening act was last in time solely responsible
to plaintiff, the defendant being exonerated even though the third person's act was a normal response to the defendant's anterior act of which
plaintiff complained-and therefore within the natural consequences of
defendant's act."' Now, said Mr. Bohlen:
"The disability of the plaintiff whose negligence happened to
be the final decisive cause of his harm, to recover is but an obvious
application of the rule in Vicars v. Wilcocks to the facts of the case.
Similarly the so-called Doctrine of the Last Clear Chance, whereby
a defendant whose negligent act"-in not reasonably utilizing a
last opportunity to save plaintiff from harm-"was the final decisive cause of the accident was liable to the plaintiff even though
the latter had . .

.

earlier

.

. . been guilty of some default

placing him within the reach of the defendant's act"-and final inaction-"is also a necessary result of that rule applied to such
facts, and not, as it appears today, an anomalous exception, based
on the hardship which would follow from the rigorous and logical
20
application of the general principles of contributory negligence".
116. Bohlen, supra note 13, at 258. See also Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of
Risk, 20 HARV. L. REv. 14, 17 n.2 (1908).
117. The individualism in contributory negligence-the duty of self-protectionis very remarkable in other respects, as explained by Mr. Bohlen, and with one
alteration it underlies the form in which the doctrine of last clear chance is stated in
the Restatement. See text at note 131 infra.
118. 8 East (1806). Defendant slandered plaintiff, and the latter was in consequence discharged by his employer. Plaintiff's counsel insisted upon the actual
causation. The court held that the harm must be "the legal and natural consequence"
of defendant's act, and here it was "an illegal consequence."
119. See RESTATEMENT § 449, pronouncing view that legal causation may include
acts of any quality.
120. Bohlen, supra note 13 at 238; and see last part of quotation infra note 130.

602

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

The word "final", obviously used as a temporal sense, was italicized by Mr. Bohlen because the principle in question-treating the
latest act as the sole responsible cause-would only partially then explain the bar of contributory negligence, and obviously explains nothing
today ;'2' and Mr. Bohlen himself emphasized both those facts. 2 The
principle of Vicars v. Wilcocks could be identical with that underlying
the defense of contributory negligence only if (1) there was nothing
more in that case than a "principle of limitation of liability, purely
legal", 28 attaching liability to the latest negligent act alone, and if (2)
there was nothing more to the bar of contributory negligence than the
same liability of the later actor. But the problem in the Vicars case
was not so narrow. In Mr. Bohlen's words it "added to a consideration
of the actual sequence of events a scrutiny of the legality or illegality of
the various steps therein"; and not only did Lord Ellenborough seem
to emphasize this, 124 but so also does the special repudiation of the distinction in the Restatement.'25 Likewise as regards contributory negligence, there was negligence prior to, contemporaneous with, and subsequent to that of defendant. We have seen that Holdsworth, in order
to explain the defense of contributory negligence by latest-act causation,
limited the defense to the last situation alone. 2 To identify this with
the causation formula of the Vicars case is to do the same thing. Mr.
Bohlen himself pointed out this fact; his explanation assumes that it
was overlooked by Lord Ellenborough. However, Mr. Bohlen's other
explanation of contributory negligence as an expression of (imputed)
individualism, actually covers the whole doctrine, and Ellenborough's
27
own words in Butterfield v. Forrester seem to rest on that basis.
Moreover, the idea does seem fantastic that a principle governing a last
act by a third person, and intervening in a causal relationship already
existing between plaintiff and defendant, would have been applied by
any judge-and particularly by Lord Ellenborough, who was a conservative above conservatives-to an earlier act by plaintiff himself
which was part of the original causal relationship between plaintiff and
defendant. Mr. Bohlen did not refer to any parallel in law to this phenomenon. On the whole, his theory seems unfair to Lord Ellenborough. The situation seems to be essentially the same when one considers the application of the suggestion to the doctrine of last opportun121. Id. at 241, 259.
122. Id. at 236.

123. Id. at 240.

124.
125.
126.
127.
care for

See note 108 supra.
§ 449.
Note 66 supra.
"One person being in fault will not dispense with another's showing ordinary
himself"-11 East 60, 61 (1809).
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ity. Particularly as respects the last point made above, and even if the
doctrine be confined (as in the Restatement) to the defendant, there
would still be involved the same logical impediment, the same tremendous step from one set of facts to another.
Mr. Bohlen disliked the defense of contributory negligence, but
seemingly, as indicated in a passage already quoted,"2" only because it
violated the test of proximity in legal causation, or was unexplainable
thereunder. Nowhere did he explain an aversion to it as working injustice. The individualism of a duty of self-protection manifestly appealed to him, and he ignored the distinction between its voluntary and
involuntary forms. Had he felt any ethical objection to the defence he
would probably have acknowledged some good in "the Doctrine of the
Last Clear Chance". But he acknowledged none. The capital letters
were not an obeisance to it; they were unquestionably derisory. And
the only stated reason for this dislike was the doctrine's supposedly obsolete principle of causation.
"In many jurisdictions"-he said-"there has persisted in this
one particular connection [with contributory negligence], that
conception . . . which prevailed when the earliest cases on con-

tributory negligence were decided, and which has become obsolete
in other fields which regarded the last actor, him whose conduct
supplied the final impulse, as the sole responsible cause, and this
whether the plaintiff's peril was actually known to the defendant
or could have been discovered had he exercised normal care. Nor
is it strange that in this one particular class of case the archaic
idea continues. The very tendency toward a fuller and more
complete measure of responsibility on the part of those guilty of
social misconduct which led to the repudiation of the rule in Vicars
v. Wilcocks where it restricted liability, [of the original defendant
in the three-party situation], naturally tended to retain it [in the
two-party situation] where its abandonment would have restricted
rather than enlarged the liability of a negligent defendant". 129
It does not appear how old the rule was which Mr. Bohlen made
the putative parent of the doctrine of last opportunity. The latter is not
ancient. Nor is it antiquated or obsolete in its result of enlarging the
liability of the negligent defendant whom the older doctrine wholly
relieved; to that extent Mr. Bohlen's approval of it can be found by
implication in his writings, despite the absence of explicit approval. On
the other hand, his only complaint was that this result is reached by
assuming that the older doctrine's rule of "last decisive impulse" is a
rule of causation adequate to justify the result. But even though its
128. Note 89 supra.
129. Bohlen, mipra note 13, at 258-59.
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origin, if it was what he suggests, would be nothing of which to boast,
a condemnation of the doctrine for that reason must seem trifling to anyone who considers the rule justified by its occasional nullification of the
bar of contributory negligence, and who finds a real causal explanation
of it in the defendant's preponderant social fault of failing to utilize reasonably his superior power to save plaintiff from harm when the latter's
power is known (or should be known) by the defendant to be less.
That his fault is less follows plainly from Mr. Bohlen's own discussion
of the duty to protect one's self and the duty to protect others, for he
wrote:
"Where the right to recover is based on the idea that one
should make good the harm, caused by his social delinquencies,
and where, as in all cases of contributory negligence, the defendant's delinquency would have caused no harm to the plaintiff save
for his own misconduct in not caring for himself",-which obviously puts upon the latter originally an absolute duty of selfprotection-"there is no reason that the law should regard one as
the delinquent rather than the other. There is no reason to throw
upon the one rather than the other the burden of preventing an
accident actually preventable by proper care on the part of either,
or of answering for the ensuing harm.

It is . . . because the

law will not aid a plaintiff who having the power and consequent
duty to protect himself has failed to do so . . . that the defend-

ant is relieved from liability by the plaintiff's contributory negligence.
"But it is only where there is equal ability, equal opportunity
to avert the harm, that this applies. .

.

. When the plaintiff is

for any reason impotent to protect himself, the defendant is bound,
if he himself be able by care to avoid harming him, to do so".'
It is not clear in this passage when the absolute duty of plaintiff ends
and the qualified duty of defendant begins; but the Restatement, which
plainly adopted the above ideas, sets the latter at the moment when
plaintiff's impotence becomes known to defendant. And therefore,
plaintiff's duty having ended, and likewise any possibility of continuing
fault in not saving himself, defendant's later omission is the only, and
necessarily the preponderant, fault involved in the harm.
At the end of an article written as "an exploratory excursion into
the power and mystery of common-law causation as that word has been
used in last clear chance cases", Mr. Maclntyre concluded that "The
whole last clear chance doctrine is only a disguised escape, by way of
comparative fault, from contributory negligence as an actual bar". 3 '
130. Id. at 256.
131. MacIntyre, supra note 75, at 1226, 1251.
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That this is plainly suggested by the early cases on the subject has appeared from their examination. 3s That no theory of legal causation
advanced to explain the doctrine is adequate to do so has been generally
admitted.
The doctrine appears in two sections of the Restatement, limited
to personal injuries. In § 479 (a) plaintiff exposes himself to a risk
potential in defendant's activity and "immediately preceding the harm"
is helpless to escape it. Under these circumstances, (b) the defendant
is liable if (owing a duty to the plaintiff to be alert) (i) he knows
plaintiff's situation and realizes or (ii) a reasonable man would realize
plaintiff's peril, or (iii) if a reasonable man would have discovered
plaintiff's situation and peril, and (c) thereafter fails to exercise "with
reasonable care .

.

. his then existing ability to avoid harming the

plaintiff". Section 480 provides for cases in which plaintiff, by exercising reasonable care, "could have observed the danger in time to have
avoided harm therefrom", and declares defendant liable under conditions
substantially similar to those covered by § 479. There is no difference
of moment in the causal problems of the two Sections. There is only
one reference to cause in the Comments, none in the text of the Sections.
In discussions of these situations one finds, as in other situations
in which this has already been merely incidentally adverted to, an entanglement of rules of causation with talk about fault. Negligence is a
social fault-to follow Mr. Bohlen in using a word that avoids the objection that some writers raise in denying that some types of negligence,
particularly mere inadvertence, are neither "culpable" nor immoral.
There can be an earlier or a later fault of blameworthy conduct, but the
consequences of all conduct involved in bringing about a harm must in
fact (though often not so treated in legal causation) continue up to and
merge in that result. There cannot be a "last" cause, or one separable
in actuality from others.
The judges have commonly said that defendant is liable because
his inaction is the sole cause of the harm. This plainly contravenes
natural causation and discredits "legal" causation, since the consequences of plaintiff's wrongful act, as just said, clearly continue. Mr.
Bohlen more cautiously said that his conduct "is to be regarded as the
ultimate or final cause of the accident" 3 ---which both impugns by intimation the rule stated, as one ignoring the preponderance of defendant's fault, and reiterates his explanation of the decisions as resting on
the "archaic" rule discussed above. Judges have also often attempted
132. See text at note 28 wpra.
133. Bohlen, Case Note on the rule in British Columbia Railway Company v.
Loach, 66 U. oF PA. L. Ray. 73, 74 (1917).

606

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

to rationalize the decisions by saying that plaintiff's act merely creates
a "condition", from which it is intimated, no harm will result until
acted upon by defendant's later negligence-a new fault. This mixes
doctrines of act-causation and fault. There are successive faults; defendant's negligence is a "fresh wrong", and the two faults are, as such,
separable. On the other hand all this is inapplicable to acts considered
as forces or causes. What else can be so plainly continuing as a stabilized "condition" ? The vice in the error is that of employing figurative
speech, already referred to in another connection. It invites one to
infer from the passivity of the pole stretched across the road in Butterfield v. Forrester,or the stability of the state of helplessness involved in
§ 479, a halt in the consequences emanating from a wrongful act.
The truth is that beneath this talk about "condition" and "fresh
wrong" lies the fact that the law is here laying aside the chain of actand-consequence and basing liability on the comparatively greater fault
of the defendant. That is, an attempt is made to do justice and then
explain, as well as traditional language allows, the reason. To do this
openly would be only a slightly greater repudiation of actual causation
than the two preceding artifices of "legal" causation. A strengthening
tendency to lay aside the act and consider the fault in dealing with the
difficult ethical problems of the last-opportunity situation is discernible
in other places. For example, Mr. Bohlen suggested that plaintiff's
default in subjecting himself or property to a possibility of harm potential in defendant's conduct should be called a lack of "pre-caution" as
contrasted with the lack of "caution" manifested by defendant in the
later "crisis" in which he might still have averted the harm. And to
this he added the opinions that when defendant's default is solely such
lack of pre-caution a like default on plaintiff's part "will debar the
latter", while absence of antecedent precaution to avoid danger "does
not offset a lack of caution" when danger to plaintiff is known to defendant."3 4 This is virtually a suggestion that at least a large portion
of cases on contributory negligence and last clear chance be dealt with
on the theory of comparative fault--quite inconsistently, to be sure,
with other explanations of contributory negligence advanced in the
same article and with the attack therein made on the doctrine of last
clear chance.
Neither opinion of Mr. Bohlen, however, is free from difficulties.
Comprehension in a "crisis" is likely to be confused, and reaction uncertain, as the Restatement recognizes in case of an "emergency".13 5
134. Bohlen, supra note 13, at 257.
135. § 470. Compare § 457.
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Again, looking solely at social faults, suppose defendant be in charge
of a locomotive, street car, or motor car that is potentially and constantly a dangerous instrumentality threatening many people, and suppose that defendant has been guilty of neglecting the headlight or
brakes for some time previous to an accident which, had they been in
proper condition defendant could at the last moment have averted; or
guilty before, and up into the time-setting of the accident, of improper
speed, but for which he could have saved plaintiff notwithstanding the
defective condition of the brakes. Such antecedent faults (with some
fine distinctions-at least in the intent of the Restatement authors while
it was being drafted) 1"8 are disregarded under §§ 479 and 480, as
indicated above in the statement of their provisions. But would not
everybody regard such lack of pre-caution, if its consideration be permitted, as more serious than a plaintiff's lack of precaution in inadvertently walking into danger? From a social point of view, which law
should embody, is not the fact that defendant's negligence constantly
threatens many people-whether the above continuing lack of precaution
or the later negligence involved in the accident--reason for considering
the negligence particularly grave? If justice is to consider relative
faults, without constraint by artificial rules of legal causation, such
antecedent negligence cannot be excluded.
In the Restatement it is wholly excluded as respects both parties.
The plaintiff is helpless when unable to save himself "even though his
inability is because of some antecedent lack of preparation", and defendant is required to exercise only "his then existing ability", regardless of whether his ability be slight because of "antecedent lack of
preparation or a previous course of negligent conduct" .117 It seems
probable that in many cases this equality is one of rule rather than of
3 but that imperfection is perhaps inherent in the operation
substance,3'
of any rule. At any rate, treating the matter as one of causation, plain136. Mr. Lowndes discusses interestingly the distinction made by them between
British Columbia Ry. Co. v. Loach, and Dent v. Bellow'&Falls & S.R. St. Ry, Co.Lowndes, Contributory Negligence, 22 GEO. L.J. 674, 706-07. His discussion is in
terms of causation and duty. See especially the discussions in James, upra note 34,
at 708 et seq. and in Green, supra, note 37, at 21-30. As to "dangerous instrumentalities" see RESTATEMENT § 307; Green, supra, at 31-32, and Lowndes supra.
137. Comments a and f on § 479.
138. When both parties are operating motor vehicles or other machines the
equality is plainly one of substance. In factories there would doubtless have been
innumerable situations in which the same would have been true, before legislation
provided for industrial accidents. When a pedestrian is injured by the driver of a
car there is involved no "lack of preparation" such as defendant's training in the
operation of a machine, and it would be very unusual if any negligence could be involved other than that immediately incident to the accident. The requirement that
plaintiff act as an average person covers the case with very rare exceptions. (As
does-it may be added-the supposed requirement that defendant's last chance be
"clear." Does it apply to plaintiff's "helplessness" under §479, as it does to the
requirement of defendant's action? Mr. James has asked why heed plaintiff's help-
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tiff's helplessness continues as a fundamental factor in the accident,
and defendant's inability to use his brakes effectively is equally a continuing factor that, in actuality, becomes a cardinal cause of the accident. Neither is certain to become such, but the reasonable possibility
is potential in each. There seems to be no reason why consciousness
of this potentiality should not enter into the negligence of which defendant is guilty: that is, no reason for excluding it (though internal)
from the circumstances in view of which he is required to exercise
reasonable care. An unreasonable risk of harm being present to someone in the class to which plaintiff belongs, negligence toward plaintiff
exists before events identify him as an individual to whom a duty is
specifically owed. Nor-putting aside for the moment the matter of
the brakes, and assuming defendant negligent otherwise in the crisiscan reliance be placed upon the idea that defendant's causal contribution
comes later and is therefore "direct" or "proximate". Since the socalled antecedent negligence is one of continuing inaction up to the
moment of the accident it is causal in producing it, and may be the
earliest factor therein-as it was in the Loach case. Even if latest, that
is no reason for attributing to it a greater potency, or for implying that
plaintiff's inaction has no close causal connection with his harm; and
obviously even less excuse for referring to defendant's inaction as the
sole cause of the harm. It can, however, be said-returning now to the
matter of the brakes-that because of their bad condition defendant has,
in a literal sense, no chance to save the plaintiff. Thus, by having been
more negligent as a matter of social fault, and longer negligent-and
possibly by having been doubly negligent, before and in the crisis-he
wholly escapes liability under the doctrine of last clear chance.
At every step there are therefore impediments, all deriving from
rules of legal causation, which obstruct justice in last clear chance situations as our law stands in the Restatement. The terminological difficulties standing in the way of the British court in the Loach case were
perhaps even greater,'3 9 but they were not allowed to save the defendant. It simply refused to exclude the antecedent negligence, since otherwise the defendant company "would be in a better position where they
had supplied a bad brake but a good motorman than where the motor-

40
man was careless but the brake efficient".1

lessness and not defendant's inability, when both may be due to lack of the intelligence or reactions of a normal man-supra note 34. Defendant's situation is provided for under the average-person standard, plaintiff's seemingly not; but possibly
a jury would instinctively seek to apply it to the latter.)
139. Since the British courts have, seemingly, been more bound by the last-actor
doctrine than American courts.
140. [1916] 1 A.C. 719, 724, 727.
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Difficulties disappear when the problem is approached as one of
fault. The very name of the doctrine calls for identification of a last
wrongdoer, and it is clear in the doctrine's history that primary emphasis was never on the "last" (though a contrary assumption was the
only reason for Mr. Bohlen's aversion to the doctrine), but on the
wrong. In all of the cases that mark its early development that was
plain.1 4 Unless plaintiff's fault has ended before the accident-as, of
course, the consequences of his wrongful act have not--defendant cannot be a last wrongdoer. In fact, plaintiff's social fault of subjecting
himself or another to an unreasonable risk is momentary, ending with
his wrongful act, unless he has power thereafter to check its consequences by counteraction. This continuing fault of plaintiff ended with
the advent of helplessness. On the other hand, defendant's inaction
regarding the brakes is not merely antecedent to the accident; it exposes
others to a continuing risk, and ultimately the plaintiff, to the moment
of the accident. Defendant might also be guilty of the "fresh wrong"
of failing to use with reasonable care his then existing ability to avoid
the accident, but in the Loach case he was not. Had he been so, very
evidently the preponderance of his fault would be much greater under
Mr. Bohlen's explanation of the duties of the respective parties,-14
since the plaintiff's "power and consequent duty" of self-protection are
wholly of the past. But even though the defendant actually has no
power to save ,plaintiff, his fault respecting the brakes continues. That
fault justifies judgment that he is liable. Justice Cardozo's test, applied
in the Palsgraf case,143 is one purely of fault: "the risk reasonably to
be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed", 44 and carries far beyond
the mere existence of a duty, undefined in limits, stated in Mr. Bohlen's
explanation. The effect of Cardozo's principle, in Mr. Seavey's estimation, would be "that risk not merely creates the existence of liability
but defines its limits both with reference to the person injured and to
the harm." 1
(to be concluded) *
141. See text at note 28 supra.
142. Note 130 supra.
143. Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).

See L. Green, Tim Palsgraf Case, 30 COL. L.

REV.

789 (1930).

144. Id. at 344, 345.
145. Seavey, Mr. Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARV. L. Rv. 372.
381. Since the principles of liability were stated in the old terminology in the cases,
and were not based on mere fault, it is difficult to see how the framers of the Restatement could have gone farther than they did-that is, in discarding the old
terminology. But Mr. Seavey has expressed the opinions that in § 281 they "adopted

the full theory of risk," but later recanted and introduced "a confusing series of
'superseding causes,' which may cut off the liability" (in §§ 440-42) Id. at 390.

* In Part II, Professor Philbrick will discuss the history of comparative negligence

in the United States and the feasibility of administering a rule of loss apportionment

between negligent parties, with some suggestions respecting the remedial legislation
required to do away with the present principles of contributory negligence.

